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Optimal Investment in Research and Development 
Regarding a Backstop Technology 
Abstract 
 
We examine the role of investment opportunities on the marginal cost of a 
backstop technology and the resulting implications for optimal depletion of a non-
renewable resource.   We consider the case in which two economic agents (individuals, 
cities, or nations) compete for a non-renewable resource, and investments in research and 
development will reduce the marginal cost of a backstop technology.  We examine the 
problem in both social optimization and game theory frameworks.  We consider three 
scenarios: 1) The social planner’s problem in which the sum of net benefits earned by the 
two agents (players) is maximized, 2) A scenario in which two players compete for the 
limited resource, while making investments jointly, and 3) A scenario in which the 
players compete for the resource and they choose investment levels independently.    We 
examine, in particular, the case of groundwater withdrawals from an aquifer with a very 
small rate of natural recharge.  The backstop technology is desalination.  Results describe 
the optimal paths of investments in knowledge, as the original stock of groundwater is 
depleted.   Groundwater is extracted over a longer interval, and the sum of investments in 




  The concept of a backstop technology was developed in conjunction with the 
economic theory of non-renewable resources.  In brief, a backstop technology is a 
substitute for a non-renewable resource (Herfindahl, 1967; Nordhaus, 1973; Goeller and 
Weinberg, 1976).  The supply of a backstop technology, by definition, is not limited, but 
the marginal cost of provision is higher than the marginal cost of extracting the non-
renewable resource.  Hence, it is socially optimal to extract all of the non-renewable 
resource before switching to the backstop technology.  Optimization requires also that the 
supply of the non-renewable resource is exhausted precisely at the time that the marginal 
cost of extraction reaches the higher, but constant, marginal cost of the backstop 
  1technology (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Fisher, 1981).  Classic examples of backstop 
technologies include solar energy, nuclear fusion, and desalination of seawater.  
Reductions in the marginal cost of a backstop technology will extend the time 
during which the non-renewable resource is extracted, while reducing the scarcity rents 
earned by owners of the resource, ceteris paribus.  If the marginal cost of a using a 
backstop technology can be reduced or if new backstop technologies can be discovered 
through investments in research and development, then society might benefit from 
implementing an optimal program of investments in research and development.  Private 
firms investing in research and development also may benefit if they are able to obtain 
patents for the improvements they make in backstop technologies (Dasgupta and Heal, 
1979).  The optimal program of investments in research and development likely will 
begin during the period in which the non-renewable resource is being consumed. 
The conceptual framework in which a discrete switch occurs from the use of a 
non-renewable resource to a backstop technology does not describe all empirical 
situations.  There are many cases in which both a non-renewable resource and a backstop 
technology provide products and services to consumers.  For example, many consumers 
derive energy services from a mix of fossil fuels and solar energy sources.  Recent 
developments in groundwater pumping technology enable farmers to use solar energy to 
power their pumps.  Some farmers adopting the new technology retain their connection to 
the electricity grid system, to enable the use of that energy source when necessary.  In the 
automobile industry, some new cars are powered by a hydrogen fuel cell, while others are 
powered by a mixture of gasoline and “renewable” electricity that is generated while the 
gasoline engine is running.   
  2  The potential benefits from investments in research and development in backstop 
technologies may be substantial in regions where non-renewable resources are 
diminishing rapidly and where the supply of a renewable resource is insufficient to 
satisfy increasing demands.  For example, a city or region that depends on a non-
renewable groundwater supply for drinking water might benefit from timely investments 
in research and development regarding desalination technology.  Similar benefits might 
accrue to an urban area where the surface water supply or the natural rate of recharge to 
an aquifer is insufficient to satisfy increasing municipal and industrial water demands.   
In this paper, we examine investment policies regarding research and 
development (R&D) in backstop technologies, from both optimization and strategic 
perspectives.  The technology chosen for analysis is desalination of water for use in 
municipal and industrial applications.  Desalination of seawater and brackish 
groundwater will provide larger portions of municipal water supplies in many regions of 
the world, as the demand for high-quality water continues to increase with rising 
populations and income levels.  In some areas, desalination will enable cities and nations 
to replace water supplies that once were obtained from non-renewable groundwater 
sources.  In other areas, desalination will be one of several sources of water supply that 
may include groundwater, surface water, and wastewater treatment.   
 
2.  Desalination as a Backstop Technology 
Two types of technologies have been developed for removing salts from water: 
thermal processes and membrane technologies.  Thermal processes include multistage 
flash methods (MSF), multiple effect evaporation (MEE), and mechanical vapor 
  3compression (MVC).  Membrane technologies include reverse osmosis (RO) and 
electrodialysis (ED).  The energy cost of MSF operation is approximately three times as 
high as the RO system (Darwish, 2001).  Worldwide, multistage flash and reverse 
osmosis account for 44% and 42%, respectively, of the installed capacity of desalination 
technology (Fiorenza et al., 2003).  Thermal processes are more appropriate than 
membrane technologies for desalinating seawater.  The multistage flash method accounts 
for 70% of seawater desalination capacity.   
The initial cost of installing a desalination plant can be substantial, particularly if 
it is located some distance from the source of saline or brackish water.  The high costs of 
technical components and of operating and maintaining a desalination facility have 
limited the installation of desalination plants to regions with notable effective demand for 
high-quality drinking water, such as some of the wealthier nations in the Persian Gulf 
Region.  At present, desalination provides more than 40% of municipal water supplies in 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (Al-Sahlawi, 1999; Bremere et al., 2001; 
Darwish, 2001; Hamoda, 2001).  Desalination plants in Oman provided 42 million m
3 of 
water in 1996, or about 53% of that country’s potable water supply (Al-Ismaily and 
Probert, 1998).  Desalination provides smaller portions of national water supplies in 
several other nations where the demand for water is increasing.  Cyprus began operating 
desalination plants in 1997, with the goal of someday producing 40 million m
3 of water 
per year, or about 17% of its current water demand (Tsiourtis, 2001).   
Estimates of the current cost of desalination range from $0.20 to $0.35 per m
3 
($247 to $432 per acre-foot) for brackish water and from $0.70 to $1.20 per m
3 ($864 to 
$1,481 per acre-foot) for seawater (Bremere et al., 2001).   Seawater desalination in 
  4coastal areas of the Gaza Strip and Israel might cost $0.70 per m
3 (Haddad and Lindner, 
2001), while the average cost of water produced at desalination plants on the island of 
Cyprus ranges from $0.42 to $0.54 per m
3 (Kalogirou, 2001).  The average cost of 
seawater desalination using the multistage flash method in Abu Dhabi is $1.08 per m
3, 
but transmission and distribution require an additional expenditure of $0.95 per m
3 (Abu 
Qdais and Al Nassay, 2001).  The estimated cost of desalination at a new facility 
constructed by the city of Tampa, Florida ranges from $0.46 to $0.55 per m
3 (Lokiec and 
Kronenberg, 2001; Wilf and Klinko, 2001).  The source of water is Tampa Bay, which is 
less saline than the ocean, due to inflows from surface water sources. 
Some reviewers may suggest that desalination is not a true backstop technology, 
given its reliance on fossil fuel energy sources in most of its industrial applications.  
Three considerations seem pertinent regarding that consideration:  1) The backstop 
terminology applies to the water resource, rather than the energy resource, 2) The energy 
cost, per unit of water produced by desalination has declined substantially in recent 
decades, with advances in technology, and 3) Desalination facilities can be powered by 
solar and nuclear energy sources.  The use of solar and nuclear energy to desalinate water 
may increase, over time, with developments in technology and with increases in demand 
for desalination, particularly in regions with limited or expensive supplies of fossil fuels 
(Ahmad and Schmid, 2002; Bouchekima, 2003; Fiorenza et al., 2003; Nisan et al., 2003). 
 
3. Conceptual  Framework 
Previous work regarding the optimal pattern of investment in research and 
development regarding backstop technologies is limited.  Dasgupta and Heal (1979) show 
  5that from a social perspective, the optimal research and development program will vary 
with the size of the stock of a non-renewable resource.  They describe also how private 
firms are motivated to invest in research and development by the prospect of profits they 
might earn if awarded patents for new discoveries.  In fully competitive conditions, non-
renewable resources and backstop technologies will be used sequentially, rather than at 
the same time.  However, in some cases, private firms can increase their profits by 
choosing investment and marketing strategies to influence the time at which the switch 
occurs from a non-renewable resource to a backstop technology.  The possibility of 
strategic behavior and the uncertainty inherent in searches for substitutes lead to the 
conclusion that some research and development should be undertaken by public agencies. 
Tsur and Zemel (2000, 2003) provide a model in which both a traditional resource 
and a backstop technology can be used at the same time, and investments in research and 
development reduce the marginal cost of the backstop technology.  The authors 
demonstrate that the optimal transition from the traditional resource to the backstop 
technology is smooth, rather than discrete.  Use of the backstop technology increases 
gradually, as its marginal cost declines, and as the remaining stock of the non-renewable 
resource diminishes.   
  We extend the model of Tsur and Zemel (2000, 2003) in two ways:  1) including 
adjustment costs, and 2) examining dynamic game scenarios.  Adjustment costs include 
costs associated with purchasing and installing new equipment, removing old equipment, 
and training labor to use the use the new equipment.  Dynamic game scenarios are 
examined to determine the potential gains from cooperation if two municipalities in an 
arid region combine their efforts to invest in research and development activities.  Two 
  6scenarios are examined in which the two cities compete for water from an aquifer that has 
a limited rate of natural recharge.  In the first scenario, the cities agree to cooperate in 
making investments and implementing the backstop technology.  In the second scenario, 
each city invests in its own desalination plant and operates it individually, to provide 
water only for its residents. 
 
3.1  Joint Maximization of Net Benefits 
  A dynamic optimization model of investments in research and development 
(R&D) is formulated as a discrete time, infinite horizon dynamic programming problem. 
The social planner’s model is formulated as the joint maximization of net benefits for two 
cities, p = a,b.  The benefit function is specified as B(w
p + z
p), where w
p is the amount of 
groundwater consumed and z
p is the amount of desalinated water consumed.  The source 
of water is unknown to consumers, and so the marginal benefits of w
p and z
p are identical 
and they are assumed to be positive (i.e. Bw
p , Bz
p  ≥ 0).  The cost of providing 
groundwater, C(w
p, s), is a function of the amount of water withdrawn, w
p, and the 
remaining stock of groundwater, s.  The cost function C(w
p, s) is such that Cw>0 and 
Cs<0.  Following Tsur and Zemel (2000, 2003) the marginal cost of providing 
desalinated water is assumed to be a function of accumulated knowledge, k.  In particular, 
the marginal cost of desalination decreases as k increases.  The total cost of providing 
desalinated water is D(k)z
p, where D(k) represents the desalination cost function. 
 Investments,  y
p, can be made to increase knowledge regarding desalination 
technology, which will lower the marginal cost of providing desalinated water in the 
future.  Investment is assumed to be made from the net benefit (net revenue) earned in 
  7each period, thus excluding the possibility of external funding.  As the technology 
improves, the cities need to upgrade their technology to benefit from the lower marginal 
cost of desalination.  That process generates the cost of adjustment, F(y
p).  We assume 
that the marginal cost of adjustment increases as a larger sum is invested in research and 
development. 
  There are two state variables in the model.  One is the remaining stock of 
groundwater, s, that the two cities share.  The transition equation for this stock is: 
(1)   ,   R w s s
p
p






where R represents a constant recharge rate.  Assuming the identical players, the steady 
state pumping amount is R/2 for each player.  The other state variable is the accumulated 
knowledge regarding desalination technology, k.  The transition equation for the 
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  The Bellman equation for the joint maximization of net benefits, subject to non-
negativity constraints on all the control variables, becomes: 
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, then the Euler conditions for equation (3) are: 
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Equation (4) indicates that when w
p > 0, the amount of w
p should be chosen so that 
the benefit from the last unit of groundwater taken today is equal to the sum of the 
marginal cost of pumping and the marginal user cost of groundwater.  If the marginal 
benefit is less than the sum of marginal costs, no groundwater will be withdrawn.  There 
is no limit to the amount of available for desalination.  Hence, when z
p > 0, we need only 
to equate the marginal cost of producing desalinated water with its marginal benefit 
(equation (5)).  If the marginal benefit is less than the marginal cost of desalination (for 
example, when there is little accumulated knowledge), water will be taken only from 
  9groundwater.  Equation (6) suggests that along the optimal path, a municipal water 
manager should choose the amount of investment so that the sum of the direct cost of 
investment, 1, and the marginal adjustment cost, Fy
p is equal to the discounted value of 
the investment.  Investments in R&D will not be optimal if the marginal benefit from the 
accumulated knowledge is less than the marginal cost of investments. 
Equation (4) and (5) provide interesting information.  Both w
p and z
p are positive 
only when C ) (k D p w = +δλ .  When the marginal cost of desalination is higher than 
the sum of the marginal cost of providing groundwater and the marginal user cost of 
groundwater, water is provided only from groundwater.  So, w
p>0 and z
p=0, when 
) (k D p < + C B
w w = δλ .  Similarly, w
p=0 and z
p>0, when knowledge regarding 
desalination technology accumulates to a point such that  w w B k D C p = < + ) ( δλ  is true.  
  Assuming that an internal steady state exists, manipulations of equations (4) 
through (8) produce two golden rules.  Let  p p p w w w C B MNB − = , which is the 
marginal net revenue from groundwater consumption, and  p y F + p y MC =1 . Also 



























  10The right-hand-side of equation (9) is the ratio of the marginal value of groundwater 
stock and the marginal net value of groundwater withdrawal.  The optimal, steady-state 
values of w
p and s should be chosen so that the ratio of those two terms is equal to the 
discount rate.  Similarly, the steady state values of y
p and k should be chosen so that the 
discount rate is equal to the right-hand-side of equation (10).   
 
3.2  Competition for Groundwater, with Joint Investment (Game 2) 
  In this model, the cities compete for limited groundwater, but they cooperate in 
making investments in R&D regarding desalination technology.  The cities also agree to 
operate the desalination activity in a cooperative manner.  This framework involves only 
one variable describing accumulated knowledge, k, as in the case of maximizing the sum 
of net benefits.  Although the two cities invest in R&D jointly, each city determines its 
own level of investment.  Therefore, the new transition equations for city a become: 
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The steady-state pumping amount for each player is R/2. 
  The Bellman equation for city a becomes: 
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  11The Euler conditions for this model differ from those described above for the optimal 
solution to the social planner’s model. 
 
3.3      Competition for Groundwater, with Independent Investments (Game 2) 
In this model, two cities compete for a limited groundwater resource, while each 
city invests in R&D regarding desalination technology independently.  The independent 
investments in R&D are denoted as kp for p= a and b.  For clarity, the superscripts a and 
b are used to denote the two cities.  The new transition equations for remaining 
groundwater stock and accumulated knowledge for one of the cities (a) become:  
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Assuming identical players, the steady-state pumping amounts for each player are R/2 in 
this model, just as in the social planner’s model. 
Given the new transition equations, the Bellman equation for city a becomes: 
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4. Empirical  Analysis   
4.1.  Solution Method  
  12  We use numerical methods to obtain optimal solutions for all three models.  In 
particular, we use collocation methods that involve solving for unknown coefficients of 
approximating functions, as described in Miranda and Fackler (2002).  
 
4.2.  Functions and Parameter Values 
The benefits of water consumption are defined by the following function: 
()
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The costs of groundwater pumping, are defined as a function of the volume of water 
withdrawn each year and the remaining groundwater stock, as follows: 
p p p w w
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The annual cost of desalination increases with the volume desalinated, while the 
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Adjustment costs are represented by a quadratic term involving the amount of funds 
invested each year: 
p p p y qy y F = ) (  
The following constraints are imposed on the state and control variables: 
t
p
t s w ≤ ≤ 0 ,  ,    p
t z ≤ 0 p
t
p
t NB y ≤ ≤ 0
100 0 ≤ ≤ s ,  40 1 . 0 ≤ ≤ k , or  40 1 . 0 ≤ ≤ p k  
Initial values:  ,  100 0 = s 1 . 0 0 = k  
  13Parameter values are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Parameter Values 
Parameters Values  Parameters Values 
a  5  d  2 
b  0.8  q  1 
e  0.025  β  0.1 
hmax  12  γ  0.9 
area  100  r  0.05 




5.1.  Optimal Response Functions  
The optimal level of groundwater pumping declines with reductions in the stock 
of groundwater available, but is not very responsive to changes in accumulated 
knowledge.  The optimal response function is very similar in both of the game scenarios, 
while the social planner’s scenario depicts a slightly greater responsiveness to the level of 
accumulated knowledge (Figure 1). 
The optimal response functions for desalination also depict limited responsiveness 
to changes in groundwater availability or the stock of accumulated knowledge (Figure 2).  
Because the maximum level of accumulated knowledge is limited, the maximum amount 
of desalination also is limited in all scenarios.  Differences among the models are 
observed in the location of the demarcation lines that divide zero desalination from 
positive amounts of desalination.  In the social planner’s scenario, desalination begins 
when the remaining groundwater is less than 40 units, provided that the accumulated 
knowledge is close to its maximum level. 
  14  The shapes of the optimal investment policy functions are consistent with 
economic intuition (Figure 3).  In all models, the response surfaces suggest that more 
money is invested in research and development when both the remaining groundwater 
stock and accumulated knowledge are small.  A comparison between Figure 3a (the 
social planner’s scenario) and 3d (the game with joint investment) reveals the shirking 
behavior of players.  In both scenarios, investments are made jointly and the parameter 
values are identical.  However, while investment becomes positive when the remaining 
groundwater is 40 units in the social planner’s scenario, investment remains at zero until 
the remaining groundwater is 20 units in the game with joint investment.  The largest 
investment amount is observed in the game with independent investments.  This is 
because players do not receive external benefits generated by the investments of other 
players, as they do in both the social planner’s scenario and in the game with joint 
investments.   
   
5.2.  Optimal Paths of States and Controls 
Further insight regarding the results can be gained from graphs of the optimal 
time paths for the state and control variables.  In all graphs, we show the time path for 
only one of the two players in the game scenarios because we assume that the players are 
identical.  The optimal paths of groundwater extraction are very similar in both of the 
game scenarios, and those paths lie above the optimal path for the social planner’s model, 
through the first ten years (Figure 4).  Groundwater pumping diminishes quickly beyond 
year 10 in the game scenarios, while it diminishes more slowly in the social planner’s 
scenario.  Groundwater is depleted by year 13 in the game scenarios, while depletion 
  15occurs in year 17 in the social planner’s scenario.  The time paths depicted in Figure 4 are 
consistent with expectations.  Groundwater is depleted more quickly when players 
compete for the limited resource, than when a social planner chooses extraction rates to 
maximize the sum of net benefits. 
Investments in knowledge begin in year 7 in the social planner’s scenario and 
they continue through year 15 (Figure 5).  Hence, it is socially optimal to begin investing 
in knowledge while groundwater is still available, and to stop investing just before the 
switch from groundwater to desalination is completed.  When the players compete for 
groundwater, but they invest jointly in knowledge, investments do not begin until year 9 
of the pertinent scenario, and they continue through year 17 (Figure 5).  The sum of 
investments appears to be similar in the social planner’s scenario and in the game 
scenario in which the players make joint investments.  The nominal sum of investments 
also appears to be similar, although we have not yet computed the areas under the curves 
depicted in Figure 5.  Investment begins much earlier in the scenario in which players 
compete for groundwater and they make investments independently.  Investments are 
larger in at least two of the years in this scenario and investment ends at about the same 
time as in the other scenarios (Figure 5).  Hence, the nominal sum of investments is 
largest in this scenario.  One explanation for this result might be that when players 
compete for groundwater and they make investments independently, they must begin 
making investments earlier and they must invest a larger sum to achieve the desired 
reductions in the marginal cost of desalination.  In addition, the players in this game do 
not receive external benefits generated by the investments of the other players, as they do 
in both the social planner’s scenario and in the game with joint investments.   
  16The optimal investment paths depicted in Figure 5 generate the optimal paths of 
knowledge accumulation shown in Figure 6.  The optimal paths for all three scenarios 
begin rising about the path depicting the exogenous rate of increase in knowledge at some 
time between year 6 and year 11.  The optimal paths for the social planner’s model and 
the game in which player make independent investments decisions are very similar, while 
the path for the game in which players make joint investments in knowledge begins rising 
above the exogenous path at a later date.  That delay is consistent with the delayed 
investments in knowledge in that scenario (Figure 5). 
The switch from groundwater to desalinated water occurs more gradually in the 
social planner’s scenario than in either of the game scenarios (Figure 7).  The steady-state 
amount of desalination is the same in all scenarios, but that level is reached about six 
years later in the social planner’s scenario than in the other scenarios.  This result is 
consistent with the sharper decline in groundwater pumping in the game scenarios, as 
compared with the more gradual decline in the social planner’s scenario (Figure 4). 
Beyond year 17, desalination is the major source of water in all scenarios.  The 
initial stock of groundwater has been depleted and the rate of annual recharge is quite 
small.  The steady-state level of knowledge and desalination are the same in all scenarios, 
due largely to the constraint on the total amount of knowledge that can be achieved in all 
scenarios.  That constraint causes the marginal cost of desalination to be the same in the 
steady-state solution for all scenarios.  The benefit functions also are the same in all 
scenarios and, hence, the optimal amount of desalination is the same in the steady-state 
solutions. 
  17The time paths of total water consumption (groundwater plus desalinated water) 
are very similar for all scenarios in the early years, when the players are extracting large 
amounts of groundwater (Figure 8).   As groundwater is depleted, the marginal cost of 
pumping increases and players begin making investments in knowledge.  Total water 
consumption declines until the players begin using desalinated water.  Interestingly, the 
time path of total water consumption for the social planner’s scenario lies below the time 
paths for the other scenarios until desalination reaches its optimal level.  However, 
nominal annual net benefits are higher in the social planner’s scenario, during the 
transition from groundwater to desalinated water, than in either of the game scenarios 
(Figure 9). 
The time paths of annual net benefits for the three scenarios differ substantially 
during the period in which the transition is made from groundwater to desalinated water.  
The annual net benefits are similar during the early years of the scenarios, but they begin 
declining more sharply for the game with independent investments in about year 6 
(Figure 9).  The annual net benefits for both game scenarios are small than the net 
benefits in the social planner’s scenario from year 10 through year 17.   Annual net 
benefits are the same in all scenarios, once the steady-state solutions have been achieved.  
As expected, the present value sum of net benefits is highest in the social planner’s 
scenario, given the number of years in which the annual net benefits exceed those in both 
of the game scenarios. 
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Optimal annual groundwater Pumping, 
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Optimal annual desalination, 
as a function of groundwater remaining and 
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